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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD DALE HARDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
Case No. 17062
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff-appellant, EDWARD DALE HARDY, appeals from
an order in
State

of

granting

the Third Judicial District Court,

Utah,

entered by the

respondent's

Motion

Honorable G.

for

Salt Lake County,
Hal

Taylor,

Summary Judgment

Judge,

and denying

with prejudice appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The
hearing

above-entitled

matter having

come on

in the above-entitled court on Thursday,

April,

1980,

lant's

application

regularly

for

the 3rd day of

before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, on appelfor

Writ oi

Habeas

Corpus.

and the appellant

being sworn and testifying to the allegations of his petition, the
court having !:eard his testimony and having received transcripts
of appellant's plea and subsequent sentencing, and having reviewed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-1Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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all exhibits submitted by the respective parties, and having considered respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and having considered arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises the court ordered that respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and the issuance of a

Writ of Habeas Corpus be

denied with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The

appellant

seeks

an

order granting

his

Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, and in the alternative he seeks a reversal
of the trial court's Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment which denied with prejudice appellant's Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
That

on

or

about

February

1979,

21,

at

approximately

9:45 p.m., appellant, Edward Dale Hardy, with others, was present
at

the

Crossroads

Cafe

in

Davis

County,

State

of

Utah.

Mr.

Hardy's presence there was for the purpose of selling a given quantity

of marijuana

to one

Kirk Cordary and others with whom he

made arrangements prior to, by telephone.
There

was conflict and disputes within the Davis County

drug community arising from rip-offs and power struggles for control of the drug market in that County.

Mr.

Hardy was involved

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the foregoing

and had been warned that certain individuals in

the drug community were after him for his prior actions.
On the night in question, Mr. Hardy had partaken a substantial

quantity

of traditional street drugs prior to and during

the period arrangements were being made to sell the marijuana.
Hardy and companion,
made,

Mr.

one Kevin Gartrell, after arrangements were

departed for the crossroads and enroute procured a shotgun

for Mr. Hardy's protection.
Upon arrival at the crossroads the parties made contract.
An agreement was reached after a
solved.

dispute over the price was re-

Mr. Hardy and the deceased Kirk Cordary departed togeth-

er from the conference vehicle and were enroute to the Cordary vehicle to procure the funds needed to consummate the deal, when a
shotgun,

carried by Mr. Hardy, discharged, fatally wounding Kirk

Cordary.
The

drug

deal was never consummated.

from the scene with his companion.

Mr.

Mr.

Hardy fled

Hardy was subsequently

arrested and charged for First Degree Murder in State of Utah v.
Hardy, Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, Case No.

3107-A.
At the time of his arrest in the within matter he had one
other criminal matter pending in Davis County.

His life, other than

the aforesaid, was relatively free from involvement with the courts,
law enforcement, or the criminal system generally.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Following his incarceration, retention of counsel, and preliminary

hearing,

with

another

have

gone

and

Mr.

inmate

on

charged

a

Hardy
and

crime

with

escaped

was

spree.

several

from the Davis County Jail

reported

by

local

news

people to

He 'was subsequently apprehended

serious

offenses allegedly arising from

and during the escape flight from Davis County.
He was arrested and incarcerated in the Salt Lake County
Jail where he remained for six

(6)

weeks before being visited by

his retained counsel in the within matter.

After numerous delays,

Mr. Hardy was returned to Davis County Jail.
Mr.

Hardy

did

travel

to

a

local

psychologist

in

Davis

County for a trial conference prior to the entry of plea, however,
the results of said evaluation were not made known to him by the
evaluator or counsel.
Mr.

Hardy had few

and brief conferences with counsel in

preparation of trial in the within matter.

Mr. Hardy was visited

two

(2)

the within matter and

was

informed that counsel was not prepared to go to trial on the

days

prior

scheduled date.

to

scheduled

trial

in

Counsel further disclosed the plea negotiation a-

greement memorialized by the expiation agreement executed by Mr.
Hardy.

The degree of explanation of the meaning

and import of

the agreement did not expand on the detail set forth in the writing

itself.

bargain

as

Mr.
a

Hardy was urged by counsel to accept the plea

means

to

avoid

exposure

to the

imposition

of the

Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
the
death
penalty.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.

-4-

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Counsel
role,

for

appellant

at

no

time

explained the function,

and constitutional right to trial by jury. nor

did Mr. Hardy

know or understand the function a jury could have in determining
the imposition of death penalty in his capital case.
Mr.

Hardy

was

not

given

a

meaningful

explanation

by

counsel nor did he understand his right to confront witnesses against him and right against self-incrimination. On urging of counsel and fear of the death penalty if he didn't agree to the negotiation,

he signed the expiation agreement and the record thereof is

set before the court.
After
his

entry of

dissatisfaction

from

him.

with

sentence,
counsel

There was a

regarding the guilty plea.
Mr.

he
and

gave
the

notice to the court of
advice

subsequent hearing,

he

had received

September 20,

1979,

The plea was not withdrawn, however,

Hardy's complaint regarding counsel's assistance was made a

part of the record. From the record page 32 of the transcript, September

20,

1979,

inferentially,

it was a

foregone conclusion that

the court would not impose the death penalty.
Mr. Hardy was sentenced to life imprisonment and did not
appeal

the

foregoing

proceedings.

The on

record

statement by

counsel present was that he believed there was no merit for ap-

peal.
Mr.

Hardy subsequently commenced this proceeding by fil-

ing the within Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District,
Salt
Lake
County,
Stateprovided
of byUtah,
CB0-700.
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
the Institute Case
of Museum No.
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The
Judgment

trial court

denying

granted respondent's Motion for Summaq

appellant's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Appellant appealed to the above-entitled court for relief sought in
his petition or reversal of the trial court order·
ARGUMENT
POINT I
COURT
INAPPROPRIATELY
GRANTED
RETHE
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
WERE SHOWN AND RESPONDENT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Summary

Judgment,

Rule

56 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Subsection (c), provides in pertinent part as follows:
. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
and answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with affidavits, if
any show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law . . .
This court has interpreted the meaning of the foregoing·
subsection in Bullock v.
U.2d 1, 354 P2d 559,

Deseret Dodge Truck Center

Inc., 11

( 1960), and set down the well established

standard by which other courts grant Motion for Summary Judgment, to-wit:
A Summary Judgment must be supported by
evidence, · admission and inferences which,
when viewed in the li ht most favorable to
the oser, show t at t ere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law; such showing must preclude

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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all reasonable
could, if

that

the

loser

which

in

is

The
the

court

and

aver.

gist

must

of the Motion for Summary Judgment is that

find

from

the

pleadings,

evidence,

admissions

inferences viewed most favorably to the non-moving party

there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding the nonmoving

party

from

relief whatsoever,

and that the prevailing

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Tanner
v.

Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-op,

( 1961 ),

and Frederick May & Co.

11 U. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18
v.

Dunn,

13 U.2d 40, 368

p .2d 266, ( 1962).
The
part
of

he

had

certain

appellant
been

facts

filed

a

Verified

Complaint

alleging

in

denied full disclosure by his trial counsel

and

possible

defenses

in

the

within

matter.

That based on the information provided to appellant as is provided in the court record, appellant had not entered a knowing
and voluntary plea of guilty to said capital offense.
sonable

inference flowing from appellant's Complaint regarding

counsel is averments of ineffectiveness of counsel.
least,
page

The rea-

the

court

transcript

of

September

12 of respondent's exhibit,

20,

At the very

1979,

page 32,

appellant stated in pertinent

part as follows:

-7-
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I 'd like it known and have the court
aware that I still believe that I was misrepresented and I was given bad advice.
A review of the record reveals that there was no meaningful
in

its

discussion

in the expiation agreement,

proceedings

of

the

appellant's

or by the court

constitutional

right

to

trial and right to trial by jury.
The right to jury trial in such a case is significant,
as

it relates to the burden .of proof on the State to prove be-

yond a

reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense

for which appellant is charged.

The court in its inquiry and

the recitals in the expiation agreement failed to specifically delineate the elements of the charge to which appellant was pleading guilty,

define the burden of proof the State would have as

to each and every element thereof and

the

requirement

that

each and every juror. so find that the State had met that burden.
Furthermore, there was a failure to disclose the significant

role

of

the

jury

function

death penalty is imposed, to-wit:
ing

requiring

a

in

capital

cases

where

the

A separate and distinct hear-

unanimous finding on the issue of whether the

imposition of the death penalty is appropriate under the circumstances of the instant case.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There was a failure to disclose the automatic right of
appeal to this court from judgments imposing the death penalty.
All

of

the

foregoing

are

facts

that

were

not

made

known to the appellant that are significant considerations that
should have been made known in the interest of justice to one
considering

a

plea bargain under the threat of the imposition

of the death penalty.
It is submitted that based on the foregoing
court

inappropriately

Judgment.

granted

the trial

respondent's Motion for Summary

The appellant pled he was not informed and the rec-

ord from the below court is devoid of meaningful disclosure of
specific constitutional rights. There are genuine issues of material fact and as a matter of law, respondent is not entitled to
judgment.

POINT II
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE APPELLANT DID NOT MAKE A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY
WAIVER
OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WHICH IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE
TRIAL COURT TO ACCEPT HIS GUILTY PLEA.
One cannot waive Constitutional Rights if one lacks actual kncwledge of the substantive meaning of those Constitutional Rights.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395

tT.S. 238, 23 LEd.2d 274, 1969, .held that before a court may accept

a

guilty

waiver cf

plea,

specific

there

must

be

a

knowing

Federal Constitutional

and

Rights.

voluntary
The

court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stated the scope of the waiver as:
Several Constitutional Rights are involved
in the waiver that takes place when a plea
of guilty is entered in a State criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the
Fifth
Amendment
and
applicable
to
the
States by reason of the Fourteenth, Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S.1, 12 LEd.2d 653, 84 SCt.
1489. Second, is the right to trial by jury,
Duncan
v.
Louisiana,
391 U.S.
145, 20
LEd. 2d 491, 888 SCt. 144. Third is the right
to confront ones accusers, Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 13 LEd. 2d 923, 85 SCt. 1065.
We cannot presume a waiver of these important Federal Rights from a silent record.
The issue of the effective waiver of Federal Constitutional

Rights

standards,

in

a

Douglas

State
v.

proceeding

Alabama,

380

is

governed

U.S.

14-13

by

Federal

LEd.2d

934,

1965.
The court in Boykin, ibid. , held that:
A plea of guilty is more than admission of
conduct, it is a conviction. Ignorance, uncomprehension,
coercion,
terror,
inducements, subtle and blatant threats might be
a
perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality.

A
APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY
AND
VOLUNTARILY
WAIVE
HIS
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
In the case at bar appellant was not given a meaningful explanation of his right to trial by jury.

Both the expia-

ti on agreement and the court record is devoid of any inquiry
of

appellant's

understanding

of the

purpose,

function or role

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of a

jury trial. Likewise, the appellant had had little contact

with the court system to give him independent knowledge from
which

he

could

reasonably

rely to make an intelligent choice

of action. The trial court at page 29 of Transcript of the Proceeings on August 15,
to

trial

by

jury

1979,

issue

in

made brief reference to the right
a

profunctory

fashion,

failing

to

make any mention of appellant's right to trial by jury, to-wit:
The

court:

Do you understand that this
plea of guilty would take the
place of a trial, and in fact
there would be no trial, and
you would be waiving your
right to appeal?

The court failed to mention the constitutional right to
trial by jury, and it made no inquiry as to whether appellant
knew or understood that if he was tried by a jury the verdict
of guilty must be based on a unanimous finding that the State
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of each and every element of the offense for which the appellant stood charged.
Similarly,

trial counsel in the expiation agreement at

page 40, under the section entitled "YOU ARE NOW SPECIFICALLY
ADVISED OF THE LAW:
If you plead guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty
you waive the right to trial by jury."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The
of the

record is devoid and appellant was not informed

significant

Section 76-3-206,

function

the

jury fulfills in capital cases·

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, pro-

vides:
Capital felony-Death or life imprisonment.( 1) A person who has been convicted of a
capital felony shall be sentenced in accordance with section 76-3-207,
and sentence
shall be death or life imprisonment as the
court of jury, in accordance with this section shall determine.
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence
of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Utah State Supreme Court within
60 days after certification by the sentencing
court of the entire record unless time is extended an additional period not to exceed
30 days by the Utah State Supreme Court for
good ca use shown. Such review by the Utah
State Supreme Court shall have priority over
all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Utah
State Supreme Court.
Section 76-3-207 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Capital felony-Hearing on sentence.-( 1) When
a defendant has been found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue
of penalty. The proceedings shall be conducted before the court or jury which found the
defendant guilty
In these proceedings, evidence may be presented as to any
· matter the court. deems relevant to sentence,
including but net limited to the nature and
circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and
physical condition, and any other facts in
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.
The state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to present argument
for or against sentence of death. . . . MitiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-12Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gating circumstances shall include the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history
of prior criminal activity;
. . ( d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirement
of law w.1s substantially impaired as a result of mental disease, intoxication, or influence of drugs;
(2).
In all proceedings before a jury,
under th is section, it s ha 11 be instructed
as to the punishment to be imposed upon a
unanimous verdict for death and that to be
imposed if a unanimous verdict for death is
not found.
• If the jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of death, the court shall discharge
the jury and impose the sentence of life imprisonment.
In addition,
case

constitutes

a

the waiver of a

jury trial in a capital

double waiver of Constitutional Rights,

to-

Right to tria 1 by jury and right to an automatic appeal

wit:

in the event the dertth sentence is imposed. This factor was not
disclo~ed to the app~llant.

The

role

·"if

the

jury

in

capital cases is a

material

consideration that ri1Ust be weighed by one charged with a capital offense before he can intelligently waive his right to trial
by jury.
Boykin,
The

Subtle coercion was recognized by Justice Douglas, in
ibtd.,

languag,~

.3.S

f:-c1!11

a

possible
the

cover-up for unconstitutionality.

expiation

agreement pertaining

to

the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reason for the change of plea smacks of such coercion, to-wit:
and that you are pleading guilty to
this to avoid the exposure to the death penalty.
The

diss-ent

in

the

United

States

Supreme Court case

of United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 LEd.2d 138, 1968,
recognized that:
Pleas of guilty and waivers of jury should
be carefully examined before they are accepted in order to make sure that they have
been neither coerced nor encouraged by the
death penalty power in the jury.
In

the

instant

capital case,

the role of the jury in

effecting the death penalty is not shown to have been explained

to

appellant,

and

yet

trial counsel recommended appellant

change his plea to guilty to insure avoidance of the imposition
of

the

death

penalty.

The

common

understanding

and

import

from the language of the expiation agreement is that appellant
exposes himself to the death penalty by invoking his Constitutional Right to Trial By Jury. The true import of the jury impact in the capital case has been set forth by statute above.
It

is

submitted

that

the

appellant

was

coerced

into

changing his plea because he believed a jury trial would mean
his execution.
It is further submitted that from the record,

ingful

disclosure

of

appellant's

Constitutional

Rights

no meanto
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jury

trial

was

given and therefore no knowing and voluntary waiv-

er of said Constitutional Rights to Trial By Jury was effected.

B
APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWL INGLY
WAIVE HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION.
The

court

record

of

August

15,

1979,

fails

to

make

any reference or inquiry into appellant's understanding of his
right not to be a witness against himself. Furthermore, the expiation agreement,

at page 40, sets forth the following conclu-

sionary assertion:
You have the right .
against self incrimination
''If you plead guilty, you
waive these rights".
Appellant's knowledge of the nature of the offense for
which he stood charged, his presumption of innocence; and the
burden of proof on the State, was not shown in the record. The
record does not show appellant knew the nature of the offense
for which he was pleading guilty.
State

had

a

More specifically, what the

burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt in

the event the Constitutional Right to Trial By Jury was invok-

ed.
Appellant was charged with First Degree Murder, a violation of Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
Murder in the first degree-( 1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree
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if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the
following circumstances:

. ( d) the homicide was committed while
the actor was engaged in the commission of,
. aggravated robbery . . ..
(2) Murder in the first degree in a capital
offense.
The court made only cursory inquiry into the elements
of knowingly and intentionally committed the act that resulted
in the homicide, and the court failed to make inquiry or state
as a proposition that the homicide was committed while the actor was
The

engaged

in

the commission of an aggravated robbery.

nature of the offense

charge

would

require

the State to

prove the respective elements of the aggravated robbery beyond
a

reasonable doubt in order for the appellant to be convicted

of the offense of First Degree Murder as charged.
The
disclosing
charged.

the
The

expiation
nature

agreement
of the

did

offense

not
for

assist
which

last paragraph of said agreement,

the court in
appellant was
page 40, set

forth the following:
By your signing, you are acknowledging to
me that you did in fact shoot and kill Kirk
Cordary . . .
The foregoing

purported admission could relate to any homicide

from Justifiable Homicide to the offense of First Degree Murder
and

fall

substantially short of making certain on the record,
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that appellant knew the nature of the offense to which he was
pleading guilty.
It is encumbant on the State to prove each of the foregoing

elements

of

the

doubt.

Section 76-1-501,

charged

offense

beyond

Utah Code Annotated,

a

reasonable

1953,

as amend-

ed, provides in pertinent part as follows:
Presumption of innocence-"Element of the offense" defined.-( 1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
( 2) As used in this part the words "element
of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances,
or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited,
or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b)
The
77-31-4,

The culpable mental state required .
cor<?llary to the foregoing_ rule of law is Section

Utah

Code Annotated,

1953,

as

amended,

which

pro-

vides as follows:
Defendant presumed innocent-Reasonable doubtA defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved,
and in case of a reasonable doubt
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.
It is submitted that the court record is devoid of any
specific

or

meaningful

inquiry

into

appellant's

Constitutional

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

Right against compulsory self-incrimination and pursuant to the
requirements and learning from Boykin,

ibid.,

the guilty plea

entered by appellant entered herein was therefore not knowingly and voluntarily made.

c
APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY
AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSORS.
The
1979,

Court

Transcript

of

proceedings

on

August

15,

is devoid of any mention ·of appellant's Sixth Amendment

rights to confront the witnesses against him. The court did not
make specific inquiry as to that right,

its waiver,

or appel-

lant 's understanding of the Constitutional Right.
The

expiation

agreement

at

page 40,

makes reference

to said Constitutional Right as follows:
You have the right to be confronted by the
witnesses against you
if you plead
guilty, you waive these rights.
It is doubtful,

and there is no showing that appellant

had substantive understanding of what· was afforded the accused by the Constitutional Right and just how he would exercise
said

right.

As to either of the foregoing

inquiries,

the court

r.ecord is devoid of any meaningful showing that appellant did.
in fact waive his Constitutional Right to confront witnesses against him.
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D

THE ADEQUACY OF THE COURT RECORD TO DETERMINE THE APPROp RIA TENESS OF A ST ATE COURT 'S
ACCEPTANCE OF A GUILTY PLEA
CONTROLLED
BY
FEDERAL
IS
STANDARDS.
The waiver of Federal Constitutional Rights are governed

by

Federal

standards;

see

Douglas

v.

Alabama,

ibid;

no

waiver can be presumed from a silent record, see Boykin, ibid.;
reasonable
the

adherence

record

to

to

sustain

Federal
attack

mandates

for

must

inadequacy,

be clear from
see Garner

v.

Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173, 7 LEd.2d 207 (1961).
The court record in the instant case, considered in its
entirety, fails to comply with the Federal standard as set forth
in Boykin, ibid., i.e., it is devoid of sufficient inquiry by the
court
his

or counsel to ascertain whether appellant when entering
guilty

plea

knowingly

and voluntarily waived

his

rights

under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.
POINT I II
APPELLANT'S APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS.
The

extraordinary

remedy of Writ of Habeas

Corpus,

Rule 65B(f), et sec, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
pertinent part as follows:
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( i) any person imprisoned in the penetentiary or county jail under commitment of
any court, whether such imprisonment be un. der an original commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or parole,
who asserts that any proceedings which resulted in his commitment that was a substantial denial of liis rights under the
stitution of the Unted States or the State of
Utah or both ma
institute proceedin s on
this rule.
Emphasis added.

con-

The foregoing language is absent of any condition precedent of

a

requirement

the

issues

raised

pursuant to said

rule requires that a direct appeal be exhausted before one seek
remedies thereunder.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Writ of Habeas Corpus
is properly invoked when the court has no jurisdiction over the
person or the offense, or the requirements of law have been so
disregarded that the party is substantially and effectively denied due process of law, or where some such fact is shown that
it

would

be

unconscionable

not

to

re-examine

the

conviction.

Bryant v. Turner, 19 U. 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121, 1967, Helmuth v.
Morris,
( 1979).

598

P.2d

333

(1979),

Gentry

v.

Smith,

600 P.2d 1008

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this position in the

cases of Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (1979), Chess v. Smith,
1617 P.2d 341, 343 (1980).
Appellant in the instant case,
and

effectively

denied

trial court proceedings.

has been substantially

due process of law as

a

result of the

The appellant was denied effective as-
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sistance of counsel at the time of sentencing. At the foregoing
hearing he raised objections as to the effectiveness of counsel.
the sufficiency of the advice given to him, and questioned the
legitimacy

of. the

proceedings.

Notwithstanding

the

foregoing,

the court declined to provide substitute counsel to assist appellant in the proceeding,
counsel's

pre-sentence

and received and made no comment on
comment

concerning appellant's right to

appeal and the lack of merits thereof.
The resulting effect was to cause appellant not to file
a timely appeal and the comments and failure of the court to
act at the time the objections were raised actually caused prejudice and the resulting Constitutional violations.
Based
the

Utah

on

the, foregoing,

Contemporaneous

the

Objection

appellant complied
Rule

(See

Rule

4,

with
Utah

Rules of Evidence and Rule 46, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure),
thereby complying with the widely accepted Wainright v. Sykes
doctrine, Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
It is submitted that upon review the court should find
that the proceedings rose to the level of fundamental unfairness
and did substantially prejudice and deny appellant his Constitutional

Rights,

and therefore,

appellant

should be

allowed

to

remedy said issues by way of Writ of Habeas Corpus.
CONCLUSION
Based on the

foregoing,
-21-

appellant submits that there
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are

genuine issues of fact,

that respondent is not entitled to

a Judgment as a matter of law, that appellant did not knowingly

and

voluntarily waive

his

Constitutional

Rights

under

the

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and that as a result of the trial proceedings, defendant was substantially denied due process of law and as a result

thereof,

appellant

should

be

granted

his Writ of Habeas

Corpus or this matter should be remanded to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing.
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